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ST. THOMAS MORE AND NATURAL LAWt
by Mathew 0. Tobriner*
Saint Thomas More is a man of history, but to us today, he is more
than that; his life and philosophy convey a special meaning to the pres-
ent legal world. He exemplifies the concept that over and above the
law of the state there is equity itself. he stands for the supremacy of
moral law.
Born in 1478, a brilliant student at Oxford, a friend of Erasmus, a
scholar of wide dimension, he became a highly successful practitioner
of law. Hardly a cause of importance was heard in the courts of En-
gland which he did not present. He authored the classic Utopia. At-
tracting the attention of the young King Henry VIII, More was called
to the court. Often dining with More at his house in Chelsea without
previous notice, the king would discourse with him on matters of state,
astronomy, geometry and points of divinity.
When a successor had to be found for Wolsey, Henry raised More to
the chancellorship. In so doing the king had counted on More's sup-
port for his desired divorce from Queen Catherine and for his procla-
mation ordering the clergy to acknowledge him as the supreme head of
the church. More rejected both these contentions, and, finding himself
in disagreement with Henry, resigned the Great Seal. Two years later
Parliament passed a bill fixing the succession in the issue of Anne Bol-
eyn and imposing an oath abjuring any foreign potentate, and, the au-
thority of the Pope. When sent for, More offered to swear to the
succession but steadily refused the oath of supremacy as against his
conscience. Committed to the Tower, he was tried for treason, found
guilty, and executed. His last words were: "the King's good servant,
but God's first."
More was, indeed, a martyr to his belief that moral law superseded
the law of the state. This relationship of morality and equity to the law
of the state has, indeed, been a central concern of legal theorists
throughout recorded history.
t The article is adapted from a speech given on April 23, 1978 in acceptance of the award
of the St. Thomas More Law Society Medallion.
* Associate Justice, Supreme Court of California.
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This relationship was a central concern of Saint Thomas More.
More was a follower of the natural law tradition which had its roots in
Greek philosophy, Hebrew doctrine, and the teachings of St. Augustine
and Thomas Aquinas: law and justice were inseparable; law, to be con-
sidered as law, to command obedience, must be just, must be in accord-
ance with the laws of nature, which, in turn, enjoyed divine sanction.
When More engaged in civil disobedience by refusing to take the oath
dictated by the Act of Supremacy, he did so because of his belief that
there were principles greater than an Act of Parliament.
When the Declaration of Independence recited as self-evident men's
endowment with the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,
it marked the beginning of a spectacular career of natural law in Amer-
ican constitutional development. While "happiness" was less impor-
tant than "property," the Constitution nevertheless incorporated the
notion that the laws of the state were to be judged by the standards of
justice.
Subsequently, the scholars began to question these alleged principles
of natural law. First, the legal positivists insisted that the use of the
term "law," except as a description of law that could be enforced be-
cause of the power of the state, caused a misconception. The law rep-
resented the command of the sovereign, and the task of the lawyer and
the judge was to interpret and apply that command. While laws might
be criticized because of their injustice, such questioning fell to the phi-
losopher, not the lawyer or the judge.
Second, and more significant in terms of constitutional development,
the broad language of the Constitution came to be identified in deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court with what has been called
"metaphysical individualism"--the notion that each individual is enti-
tled by the principles of the Constitution to hold property, to use it, and
to contract as he sees fit, without legal restraint. It was this reasoning
which led the Supreme Court, for example, to strike down as unconsti-
tutional minimum wage laws, or laws regulating the hours of labor.
"Metaphysical individualism" constituted a particular brand of natu-
ral law, and it came under attack by the legal realistic and sociological
jurists such as Holmes and Pound. These critics pointed out, and quite
correctly, that it is meaningless to talk about freedom in the abstract,
independent of economic realities. Life, liberty, and property, can
only have meaning in a particular society, in the context of particular
economic and political relationships. The search for "immutable"
principles of justice by which laws were to be judged was in that sense a
false search.
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As a result of all this and more, the term "natural law," as Professor
Lon Fuller has said, had about it for many "a rich deep odor of the
witches' cauldron."
Clearly the positivists were correct in insisting upon a distinction be-
tween law and justice; and clearly the legal realists and sociological
jurists were correct in insisting that the Constitution did not enshrine
nineteenth century views of individualism. But Morris Cohen, himself
a great philosopher, has said that philosophers are generally right in
what they affirm of their own vision and generally wrong in what they
deny of the vision of others.
There is, in natural law, a vision which is of value even to those who
are unable to accept either the concept of-divine origin or the concept
of ascertainable principles ofjustice immutable for all times and places.
It is a vision which has as its central premise that the end of law is
justice, and a just society.
As Professor Julius Stone has observed in his book Human Law and
Human Justice, natural law has historically been double edged. At
times it has served a conservative function, to legitimize the existing
social order and its legal system-to sanctify, in effect, the status quo.
Aristotle, for example, justified the separate treatment of slaves on the
ground they were born to be slaves-such was the natural order of
things. And in the Middle Ages, natural law was in large measure
conceived as dictating the so-called "natural" relationship of various
strata in society, one to the other.
At other times, however, natural law has served a more radical, even
revolutionary function-to call existing laws and institutions into ac-
count--to measure them by, standards of justice independent of the
laws themselves. That was the use to which More put natural law.
That was also the grand concept of the framers of the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution.
Natural law as conceived by our founding fathers constituted a re-
bellion against the fixed relationships of medieval society. Their focus
was upon the individual, and his right to freedom.
In the further extension of this view, the justice of a law was to be
determined not on the basis of formalistic analysis, but on the basis of
the effects of the law upon the human condition. By this, more mod-
em approach, justice does not consist of immutable principles to be
applied mechanically or deductively in a particular context, but rather
of principles, the content of which must necessarily vary with the par-
ticular society.
1978]
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A leading exponent of this approach, which surely relates back to
natural law, is John Rawls, whose A Theory of Justice has had a tre-
mendous impact upon current legal thinking. He predicates the first
society upon
the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their
own interests would accept in an initial position of equality ... In justice
as fairness the original position of equality corresponds to the state of
nature in the traditional theory of the social contract. . . . All social val-
ues-liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-
respect-are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of
any, or all, of these values is to everyone's advantage.
This modem approach echoes some of the observations of More in
his Utopia. Of course, no present-day approach proceeds remotely as
far as that in Utopia. After all, Utopia is an unreal society; the very
word was coined by More from two Greek words meaning "not" and
"place," and thus it is no place at all; it is an imaginary society. But
the reader gets a glimpse of More's version of natural law when he
writes that the Utopians "define virtue as living according to nature."
In Utopia, there is no private property. The person in Book I who
describes Utopia to More states that he agrees with Plato that the "one
and only way to make a people happy is to establish equality of prop-
erty," and that it is impossible to do this when property belongs to indi-
vidual men. "Among them [the Utopians] there is no mal-distribution
of goods, nor is anyone poor and indigent."
And, reflecting his deep religious convictions, More writes,
And what may seem strange they [the Utopians] seek support for their
pleasure philosophy from religion ... The religious principles are these:
that the soul of man is immortal and by divine beneficence has been or-
dained for happiness. Though there are many different religions among
them, yet all these, no matter how different, agree in the main point, the
worship of the one Divine Nature, as though they were all going toward
one destination by different routes.
Finally, More rejects the society that depends upon a multiplicity of
complex laws, demanding, instead, that the government see that justice
is effected. He writes that Utopians have few laws; they think it highly
unjust to bind men by laws that are too numerous to be read and too
obscure to be readily understood.
And More concludes by asking "And is it just for a government to
ignore the welfare of farmers, charcoal burners, servants, drivers, and
blacksmiths, without whom the commonwealth could not exist at all?"
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How amazing that a book written in 1516 should cast light upon
problems so crucial today and should seem to presage some of today's
thinking. In light of More's belief in the supremacy of moral law and
his questioning of the maldistribution of property, we could perhaps
conclude that his concept of natural law today would not accept the
inequities of a society so unbalanced as is our present one.
Indeed many present-day proponents of natural law in its modem
version, following the tradition of the founding fathers of this country,
challenge existing laws and institutions; they insist that the law accord
with independent concepts of justice. They see a society that is sorely
out of balance: the white middle class majority of the society enjoys the
sweet benefits of power and material goods while the disadvantaged
and the poor are denied them.
The new school of thinkers urges that the old notion of unrestrained
competition and equality of opportunity is giving way to a conception
of equality of results. The obligation of government must go beyond
affording each individual an equal opportunity in the society; it must
make sure that the individual will be afforded at least the minimum
requirement of a standard human life.
As a law clerk of mine wrote in an unpublished paper:
The proponents of functional equality are not so concerned with
opportunity, for they have learned that an equality of opportunity is often
a hollow equality indeed. They point out that though we all may assem-
ble at the same starting line, we are not all equally equipped to run the
race. Some are pigeon-toed, some knock-kneed, and some are one-
legged. They can hardly be expected to be overjoyed by the fact that
those who have sponsored the race have cheerfully agreed to allow them
to run in it.
Thus the proponents of functional equality or of the modem version
of natural law urge that positive and affirmative action must be under-
taken to give the handicapped at least an equality in fact with the un-
handicapped.
Bernard Schwartz, Professor of Law at New York University Law
School, in an essay on The Ends of Law in American Law.- The Third
Century, states the proposition in these words:
The end of law is seen to be, not only vindication of legal equality, but
also provision of equality infact with regard to more and more of the
elements that make life meaningful. The postulate that people may as-
sume that a standard human life will be assured them may give way to a
broader assumption that they are entitled to equal conditions of life as
1978]
LOYOL,4 OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
compared with their fellows. (Compare 3 Pound, Jurisprudence 321
(1959)).
The contemporary thrust for equality is one from the long-standing
tenet of equality of opportunity to the new demand for equality of re-
sult-what has been termed the New Equality. (Nisbet, The Twilight of
Authority 198 (1975)). The extent to which this demand is to be accepted
by the legal order has become a central value problem of the evolving
law. (Emphasis added).
I do not pretend in this limited space to set out whether the legal
order will accept these new approaches or what measures should or will
be undertaken to achieve this urged equality of result. I suggest only
that the quest must be for more than an analysis of the cases that follow
the law as it stands today; there must be the searching for the justice
that is greater than the law of the state: the concept that Saint Thomas
More expressed when he agreed that there were things which no parlia-
ment could do-e.g., no parliament could make a law that God should
not be God.
And thus, More takes his special place in history: he personifies the
proposition that principle is more precious than life itself. He put his
life on the line when asked to succumb to the state's demand that he
sign an oath to recognize the superiority of the sovereign over moral
law. Time and again mankind has been pressed to face similar crucial
moral issues. We have encountered such challenges only recently.
There were the Germans who faced Hitler's holocaust, our own moral
choices in the days of McCarthyism and at the atrocities of Vietnam.
When does one say "No" to the state: "this far I will go-but no far-
ther?" More's answer was a resounding "No," and it has echoed down
the corridors of history. Whenever in the course of time such agoniz-
ing moral issues arise, we shall see the gaunt, defiant figure of More
who chose the axe of the state rather than the surrender of his soul.
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